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Abstract
Clustered randomized trials (CRTs) are popular in the social sciences to evaluate
the efficacy of a new policy or program by randomly assigning one set of clusters to
the new policy and the other set to the usual policy. Often, many individuals within a
cluster fail to take advantage of the new policy, resulting in noncompliance behaviors.
Also, individuals within a cluster may influence each other through treatment spillovers
where those who comply with the new policy may affect the outcomes of those who do
not. Here, we study the identification of causal effects in CRTs when both noncom-
pliance and treatment spillovers are present. We first show that the standard analysis
of CRT data with noncompliance using instrumental variables does not identify the
usual complier average causal effect under treatment spillovers. We extend this result
and show that no analysis of CRT data can unbiasedly estimate local network causal
effects. Finally, we develop bounds for these network causal effects that only require
standard instrumental variables analysis. We demonstrate these results with an empir-
ical study of a new deworming intervention in Kenya. We find that given high levels of
compliance, we can place informative bounds on the total effect among compliers and
that the deworming intervention reduced infections among those complied with their
treatment assignment.
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1 Introduction
Policy interventions are often evaluated by randomized controlled trials as random allocation
of policy/treatment removes selection biases. However, there are two well-known complica-
tions in such trials. First, an individual’s outcome may be influenced by his as well as his
peers’ treatment assignment, a phenomena known as interference, and spillover effects may
occur (Sobel 2006). To mitigate concerns from spillovers, investigators often use clustered
treatment assignments, usually in the form of cluster randomized trials (CRTs), to allow for
arbitrary treatment spillovers within clusters (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008). Second, sub-
jects in the study may not comply with their randomized treatment assignment. For example,
some may refuse to take the treatment or seek out treatment contrary to their treatment
allocation. The method of instrumental variables (IV) is a well-understood framework to
analyze randomized experiments with noncompliance (Angrist and Krueger 2001; Herna´n
and Robins 2006; Baiocchi et al. 2014). Increasingly, policy interventions exist at the inter-
section of these two complexities and our goal is to explore the consequences of spillovers
and noncompliances in CRTs.
Our motivation comes from a public health intervention called the Primary School De-
worming Project (PSDP) conducted by a Dutch nonprofit organization, International Chris-
telijk Steunfonds Africa (ICS), in cooperation with the Busia District Ministry of Health
office (Miguel and Kremer 2004). The intervention consisted of deworming treatments for in-
testinal helminths such as hookworm, roundworm, whipworm, and schistosomiasis, delivered
to school children in southern Busia, an area in Kenya with the highest helminth infection
rates. The study was a CRT, where treatment allocation was clustered at the school level,
and as such, all students in treated schools were offered deworming treatments in the form of
oral medications. The medication was believed to have both direct and spillover effects. It
not only killed helminths among those who took them (i.e. direct effect), but also decreased
disease transmission among peers by reducing the number of helminths in the environment
(i.e. spillover effect) because students were exposed to intestinal helminths primarily through
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environmental exposures such as outdoor defecation and contact with infected fresh water.
Also, unit level noncompliance occurred as the investigators were required to obtain parental
consent for the study. Even when parental consent was obtained, students in treated schools
did not always take the deworming treatments.
There is a large literature on both treatment spillovers and noncompliance, but typically
these two topics are studied in isolation. In the literature on noncompliance in CRTs (Fran-
gakis et al. 2002; Small et al. 2008; Jo et al. 2008; Imai et al. 2009; Schochet and Chiang
2011), treatment spillovers are generally considered a nuisance and their effects are mini-
mized by clustered treatment assignment; Small et al. (2008) even notes that “the issue of
interference...does not arise” in CRTs (Section 2.1 of Small et al. (2008)). In the literature
on interference and spillover effects (Sobel 2006; Rosenbaum 2007a; Hudgens and Halloran
2008; Tchetgen Tchetgen and VanderWeele 2012; Vanderweele 2008; VanderWeele et al. 2013;
Aronow and Samii 2017; Bowers et al. 2013), the primarily focus is on defining or estimat-
ing network causal quantities when treatment compliance is perfect. A notable exception is
Sobel (2006) who studied noncompliance with interference. However, the study was limited
to non-clustered random assignment. It also did not demonstrate how noncompliance and
interference affect estimation of specific network estimands, such as spillover effects, defined
in Hudgens and Halloran (2008). Other works include Forastiere et al. (2016) who studied
noncompliance and interference under a Bayesian paradigm and Kang and Imbens (2016)
and Imai et al. (2018) who studied noncompliance and interference under multi-level designs.
Our contribution is an examination of CRTs when both noncompliance and interference
are present. First, we show that the standard analysis of CRTs with noncompliance using the
instrumental variables (IV) framework, say following the methods in Small et al. (2008) Jo
et al. (2008), and Schochet and Chiang (2011), does not identify the usual causal estimand
known as the complier average causal effect (CACE) in the presence of interference. Second,
we show more generally that no analysis of CRTs can unbiasedly estimate network effects for
noncompliance when interference is present. The second result highlights that CRTs, as an
3
experimental design, are fundamentally unsuited to learn about treatment spillovers in the
presence of noncompliance. Third, we show that if investigators already ran CRTs and both
noncompliance and interference are present in their studies, they can still derive meaningful
bounds on spillover and total effects under an assumption about treatment monotonicity,
and these bounds can be computed easily by using estimable quantities from the data.
2 Preliminaries: Notation and Assumptions
2.1 Notation
Suppose there are J clusters indexed by j = 1, . . . , J and for each cluster j, there are nj
individuals, indexed by i = 1, . . . , nj. There are N =
∑J
j=1 nj total individuals in the study
population. Let Zj ∈ {0, 1} denote the treatment assignment of cluster j where Zj = 1
indicates that cluster j was assigned treatment and Zj = 0 indicates that cluster j was
assigned control. Let Dji ∈ {0, 1} denote the observed treatment compliance of individual i
in cluster j where Dji = 1 indicates that individual i actually took the treatment and Dji = 0
indicates that the individual did not take the treatment (i.e. control). Note that while the
treatment is assigned at the cluster level, the decision to comply occurs at the unit level and
hence, there is an extra subscript i in Dji. This is important because in the PSDP, schools
were assigned to the intervention, but each student and parent in a school could choose to
comply with the intervention. Let Yji ∈ R represent the observed outcome of individual i in
cluster j. Let Y = (Y11, Y12, . . . , YJnJ ), D = (D11, D12, . . . , DJnJ ), and Z = (Z1, . . . , ZJ) be
the outcome, compliance, and treatment assignment vectors, respectively. Let Bp = {0, 1}p
be the set of all binary vectors of length p. For any vector v ∈ Bp and integer k ∈ {1, . . . , p},
let v−k denote the vector v with the kth index removed. Let I(·) denote an indicator function
where I(·) = 1 if the event inside the indicator function is true and 0 otherwise.
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2.2 Potential Outcomes, SUTVA, and Treatment Compliance
We define a causal effect using the potential outcomes notation (Neyman 1923; Rubin 1974).
For each zj ∈ {0, 1}, let D(zj)ji denote individual i’s potential compliance to treatment if
his cluster j were assigned treatment zj. Let D
(zj)
j = (D
(zj)
j1 , . . . , D
(zj)
jnj
) denote the vector
of potential treatment compliances for cluster j. For each zj ∈ {0, 1}, dji ∈ {0, 1} and
dj−i = (dj1, . . . , dji−1, dji+1, . . . , djnj) ∈ Bnj−1, let Y (zj ,dji,dj−i)ji denote individual i’s poten-
tial outcome if his cluster j were assigned treatment zj, his treatment compliance were dji,
and his peers’ treatment compliances were dj−i. Also, let Y
(zj ,D
(zj)
ji ,D
(zj)
j−i )
ji denote individ-
ual i’s potential outcome if his cluster j were assigned treatment zj and he and his peers’
treatment compliances were their “natural” compliances D
(zj)
ji and D
(zj)
j−i , respectively. Let
F = {Y (zj ,dji,dj−i)ji , D(zj)ji , zj, dji ∈ {0, 1},dj−i ∈ Bnj−1, j = 1, . . . , J, i = 1, . . . , nj} be the set
of all potential outcomes, which we assume to be fixed and unknown.
We make a couple of points about the potential outcomes notation. First, the notation
assumes partial interference (Sobel 2006), which is a specific violation of the stable unit treat-
ment value assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin 1974). That is, the potential treatment compliance
and outcome, D
(zj)
ji and Y
(zj ,dji,dj−i)
ji , are only affected by values from cluster j, specifically
zj, dji, and dj−i. Second, in a CRT, clustered treatment assignment implies that we only
observe the potential treatment compliance of individual i in cluster j when all individuals
in cluster j are assigned treatment, D
(1)
ji , or when all individuals are assigned control D
(0)
ji ;
we do not observe individual i’s potential compliance when some in cluster j are assigned
treatment and others are assigned control, say D
(0,1,1,...,1)
ji . In contrast, Hudgens and Halloran
(2008)’s two-stage randomization design allows a fraction of individuals within a cluster to
be randomized to the treatment. But, due to unit level noncompliance where only some
individuals actually end up taking the treatment, our setting allows a fraction of individuals
within a cluster to take the treatment. The key difference is that in Hudgens and Halloran
(2008), treatment taken is assumed to be random by design whereas in our work, treatment
taken is inherently non-random due to noncompliance.
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Finally, under interference, treatment compliance may be heterogeneous. The extant
literature on CRTs with noncompliance has used potential outcomes of the form Y
(zj ,dji)
ji
where the outcome is a function of individual i’s own treatment compliance dji and his
cluster treatment assignment zj (Frangakis et al. 2002; Small et al. 2008; Jo et al. 2008; Imai
et al. 2009; Schochet and Chiang 2011). Our notation here, Y
(zj ,dji,dj−i)
ji , is a generalization
of prior literature’s notation because individual i’s potential outcome is affected both by his
own compliance dji and the compliances of his peers dj−i. For example, in a hypothetical
cluster of size nj = 2, individual i = 1’s potential outcome could be Y
(zj ,D
(1)
j1 ,D
(1)
j2 )
j1 = Y
(zj ,1,0)
j1
if individual i = 1 actually took the treatment so that D
(1)
j1 = 1 and individual i = 2 did
not so that D
(1)
j2 = 0. Alternatively, individual i = 1’s potential outcome could be Y
(zj ,0,0)
j1
if individual 1 refused treatment so that D
(1)
j1 = 0. Prior literature’s notation would treated
these two potential outcomes as equal, Y
(zj ,0,1)
j1 = Y
(zj ,0,0)
j1 . In contrast, our notation makes it
explicitly clear that interference exists and is characterized by heterogeneous noncompliance.
Finally, following Rosenbaum (2007b), Small et al. (2008), and Hudgens and Halloran
(2008) our framework fixes F . This allows for correlations between potential outcomes and
compliances possibly due to homophily (VanderWeele et al. 2012; Christakis and Fowler
2013), but limits the conclusion of the study to the study participants defined in F .
2.3 Review: Assumptions
Next, we state the identification assumptions. These assumptions are standard assumptions
in noncompliance/IV and interference; a detailed discussion can be found in Angrist et al.
(1996) Baiocchi et al. (2014) (for noncompliance), and Hudgens and Halloran (2008) (for
interference). We invoke this set of assumptions to understand what can be identified from
CRTs under standard working assumptions.
(A1) Cluster Randomized Assignment. Let Z be the set that consists of vectors z =
(z1, . . . , zJ) ∈ BJ such that m =
∑J
j=1 zj for 0 < m < J . Then m out of J clus-
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ters are randomly assigned treatment and J −m are assigned control.
P (Z = z | F ,Z) = P (Z = z | Z) = 1(
J
m
)
(A2) Non-Zero Causal Effect of Z on D. The treatment assignment has a non-zero average
causal effect on individual compliance.
τD =
1
N
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
D
(1)
ji −D(0)ji 6= 0
(A3) Network Exclusion Restriction. Given individual i’s compliance dji and the compliances
of others in cluster j dj−i ∈ Bnj−1, the treatment assignment zj has no impact on the
potential outcome of individual i.
Y
(1,dji,dj−i)
ji = Y
(0,dji,dj−i)
ji ≡ Y (dji,dj−i)ji
(A4) Monotonicity. For every individual i in cluster j, we have D
(0)
ji ≤ D(1)ji .
(A5) Stratified Interference. Given individual i’s compliance dji, his cluster treatment assign-
ment zj, and k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , nj − 1}, the potential outcome of individual i is equivalent
when exactly k of his peers are taking the treatment.
Y
(zj ,dji,dj−i)
ji = Y
(zj ,dji,d
′
j−i)
ji ≡ Y (zj ,dji,[k])ji , ∀dj−i,d′j−i ∈ Bnj−1 where k =
∑
i′ 6=i
dji′ =
∑
i′ 6=i
d′ji′
We briefly comment on these assumption within the context of the PSDP. Assumption
(A1) is approximately satisfied by the design of the PSDP where the deworming intervention
was randomized to schools (i.e. clusters); see Hicks et al. (2015) and Miguel and Kremer
(2004) for additional details on the treatment assignment process. Assumption (A1) also
allow us to test assumption (A2) in the PSDP by simply taking the stratified difference-in-
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means between the treated clusters’ sum of compliance values and the control clusters’ sum
of compliance values; see Section 5 for a numerical illustration. Assumption (A3), like the
usual exclusion restriction, cannot be tested with data because it requires observing potential
outcomes under both treatment zj = 1 and control zj = 0; typically, subject-matter expertise
must be used to justify this assumption. In the PSDP, (A3) implies that the assignment to
deworming treatments had an effect on the outcome, say infection status, only through the
receipt of oral medications. If the assignment induced better hygiene that is not captured
by the treatment receipt/compliance dji or dj−i and reduced infection rates, (A3) would be
violated.
Assumption (A4) can be interpreted by partitioning the study population into four
groups, compliers (CO), always-takers (AT), never-takers (NT), and defiers (DF) (Angrist
et al. 1996). In the PSDP, compliers are students who follow the intervention, D
(1)
ji = 1
and D
(0)
ji = 0. Always-takers are students who always take the deworming treatments, ir-
respective of the intervention, D
(1)
ji = D
(0)
ji = 1. Never-takers are students who never take
the deworming treatments, irrespective of the intervention, D
(1)
ji = D
(0)
ji = 0. Defiers are
opposite of compliers in that they are students who systematically defy the intervention,
D
(1)
ji = 0 and D
(0)
ji = 1. (A4) implies that there are no defiers in the PSDP population.
In many CRTs, including the PSDP, assumption (A4) can be satisfied by design where
clusters that are not assigned to receive the new intervention (i.e. the control arm) cannot
get the intervention (i.e. the treatment arm). This is commonly referred to as one-sided
noncompliance and is formalized as assumption (A4.1).
(A4.1) One-Sided Noncompliance. For every individual i in cluster j, we have D
(0)
ji = 0
An implication of assumption (A4.1) is that there are no always-takers and defiers in the
study population.
Finally, assumption (A5) states that conditional on individual i’s compliance to treat-
ment dji and his cluster treatment assignment zj, individual i’s potential outcome Y
(zj ,dji,dj−i)
ji
depends on the number of individual i’s peers who actually took the treatment, not neces-
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sarily who took the treatment. Hudgens and Halloran (2008) talks about the plausibility of
this assumption in practice, especially in infectious disease studies like the PSDP, as well
as the statistical importance of having this assumption to estimate variances and conduct
asymptotics analyses (Liu and Hudgens 2014). Note that combining assumptions (A3) and
(A5) leads to the original stratified interference assumption stated in Hudgens and Halloran
(2008).
2.4 Review: Causal Effects with Noncompliance and Interference
Next, we review two sets of causal effects common in noncompliance and interference. First,
under noncompliance, but without interference, the potential outcome Y
(zj ,dji,dj−i)
ji collapses
to Y
(zj ,dji)
ji and two common causal effects that are estimated from data are the intent-to-treat
(ITT) effect, denoted as τY ,
τY =
1
N
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
Y
(1,D
(1)
ji )
ji − Y
(0,D
(0)
ji )
ji
and the complier average causal effect (CACE)(Imbens and Angrist 1994; Angrist et al.
1996), denoted as τ .
τ =
1
NCO
∑
ji is CO
Y
(1)
ji − Y (0)ji =
τY
τD
(1)
In equation (1), NCO is the total number of compliers in the population and the notation
Y
(1)
ji − Y (0)ji assumes (A2)-(A4). The literature also refers to τ as a local effect because it is
localized to a subgroup of the population (Imbens and Angrist 1994). The ITT effect τY is
identified under (A1) and is estimated by taking the stratified difference-in-means between
the treated clusters’ sum of outcome values and the control clusters’ sum of outcome values;
see Section 4 for details. The CACE τ is identified under (A1)-(A4) and is estimated by
taking the ratio of estimated τY and τD. This ratio is typically known as “the” IV estimator
in the literature and is the de-facto estimator for CACE in CRTs with noncompliance.
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However, under interference, it is unclear whether this standard estimator for τ identifies
CACE; we explore this in Section 3.2.
Second, under stratified interference (A5), but with full compliance (or (A3)), the po-
tential outcome Y
(zj ,dji,dj−i)
ji collapses to Y
(dji,dj−i)
ji and common causal effects of interest
are the total, direct, and spillover effects, denoted as TEji, DEji, and PEji, respectively
(Hudgens and Halloran 2008). In particular, given two compliances of individual i’s peers
dj−i,d′j−i ∈ Bnj−1 and k1, k0 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , nj − 1} where k1 =
∑
i′ 6=i dji′ and k0 =
∑
i′ 6=i d
′
ji′ ,
the total, direct, and spillover/peer effects are defined as
TEji(1, k1; 0, k0) = Y
(1,dj−i)
ji − Y
(0,d′j−i)
ji
DEji(1, k1; 0, k1) = Y
(1,dj−i)
ji − Y (0,dj−i)ji
PEji(0, k1; 0, k0) = Y
(0,dj−i)
ji − Y
(0,d′j−i)
ji
PEji(1, k1; 1, k0) = Y
(1,dj−i)
ji − Y
(1,d′j−i)
ji
TEji(1, k1; 0, k0) is individual i’s total casual effect if individual i and k1 of his peers took
the treatment versus if individual i did not take the treatment while k0 of his/her peers
did. DEji(1, k1; 0, k1) is individual i’s direct causal effect if individual i took the treatment
versus if individual i did not take the treatment and his peers’ treatment status were fixed
at k1 where k1 of his peers took the treatment. PEji(0, k1; 0, k0) is individual i’s spillover
causal effect if k1 of individual i’s peers took the treatment versus if k0 of his peers took the
treatment and individual i’s treatment status remained fixed at dji = 0 where he did not
take the treatment. PEji(1, k1; 1, k0) is the same as PEji(0, k1; 0, k0) except individual i’s
treatment status is fixed at dji = 1. The population averages of the individual total, direct,
and spillover effects can be identified under a two-stage randomization design of Hudgens
and Halloran (2008) where some clusters are randomly allocated to the “k1 policy” where
k1 individuals in the cluster are treated while the rest are assigned the “k0 policy” where k0
individuals in the cluster are treated.
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3 Identification
3.1 Target Causal Estimands
To discuss the results in the paper, we introduce three causal estimands which may be of
natural interest in CRTs with both noncompliance and interference and, to the best of our
knowledge, have not been discussed in either literature on noncompliance or interference.
Broadly speaking, the three causal estimands are the network estimands in Hudgens and
Halloran (2008) specific to subgroups of compliers, always-takers, and never-takers in Angrist
et al. (1996).
To begin, let nCOj be the number of compliers in cluster j, n
AT
j be the number of always-
takers, and nNTj be the number of never-takers. For each cluster j, we define the average
total casual effect of the treatment among compliers (CO)
TE
CO
j (1, k1; 0, k0) =
1
nCOj
nj∑
i=1
TEji(1, k1; 0, k0)I(ji is CO) (2)
where k1 > k0. In the PSDP, TE
CO
j (1, k1; 0, k0) is the average causal effect of a complier
student i along with k1 of his peers taking the deworming medication versus him not taking
the medication while k0 of his peers take the medication. We expect that TE
CO
j (1, k1; 0, k0) >
0 in PSDP, that is the deworming treatment has a net positive benefit to students who comply
with the assignment.
Also, for each cluster j, we define the average spillover effect of the treatment among
always-takers (AT)
PE
AT
j (1, k1; 1, k0) =
1
nATj
nj∑
i=1
PEji(1, k1; 1, k0)I(ji is AT) (3)
where k1 > k0. In the PSDP, PE
AT
j (1, k1; 1, k0) is the average causal effect of k1 of an always-
taker student i’s peers taking the treatment versus k0 of his peers taking the treatment.
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It can be thought of as the additional effect of having k1 − k0 always-takers’ friends take
the treatment on the always-takers’ outcomes. If PE
AT
j (1, k1; 1, k0) = 0, having additional
k1 − k0 of always-takers’ peers take the deworming medication does not affect the always-
takers’ outcomes. When PE
AT
j (1, k1; 1, k0) > 0, having additional k1 − k0 of always-takers’
peers take the deworming medication is beneficial to the always-takers’ outcomes. In the
PSDP, we expect PE
AT
j (1, k1; 1, k0) ≥ 0, that is more peers taking the deworming medication
is not harmful to the students who always take the treatment.
Finally, we define a parallel effect to PE
AT
j (1, k1; 1, k0), the average spillover effect among
never-takers for cluster j
PE
NT
j (0, k1; 0, k0) =
1
nNTj
nj∑
i=1
PEji(0, k1; 0, k0)I(ji is NT) (4)
where k1 > k0. In the PSDP, PE
NT
j (0, k1; 0, k0) is the causal effect of k1 of a never-taker
student i’s peers taking the deworming medication versus k0 of his peers taking medica-
tion. Like the spillover effect among always-takers in equation (3), PE
NT
j (0, k1; 0, k0) can be
thought of as the additional effect of having k1 − k0 of never-takers’ peers take the treat-
ment on the never-takers’ outcomes. The spillover effect among never-takers may be useful
in practice because it helps investigators understand the spillover effect of the new treat-
ment among individuals who will never take the treatment irrespective of the intervention
assignment or, in clustered encouragement designs (Frangakis et al. 2002), various encour-
agements that are used to encourage treatment uptake behavior. For example, in the PSDP,
the never-takers are students who would never take the new medication despite the study
intervention. They may choose to not take the medication due to fear of side effects, apathy
towards new medical treatments, or general skepticism about new medication. Understand-
ing how the treatment spills over to these never-takers could be useful for informing health
policy, say by understanding the effect of herd immunity among individuals who refuse to
take the treatment.
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3.2 Standard IV Analysis Does Not Identify CACE
Our first identification result states the standard IV analysis of CRT data with noncompli-
ance by taking the ratio of the ITT effect with the compliance effect (see Sections 2.4 and 4)
does not identify the CACE when interference is present. This result highlights that inves-
tigators who ignore interference in CRTs with noncompliance and instead naively conduct
the standard analysis can obtain misleading conclusions.
Theorem 1. Let wCOj = n
CO
j /N
CO, wATj = n
AT
j /N
AT, and wNTj = n
NT
j /N
NT be the pro-
portion of compliers, never-takers, and always-takers in cluster j. Suppose assumptions
(A1)-(A5) hold and there are at least two compliers in every cluster. Then, τ in equation
(1) becomes a mixture of causal effects among compliers, always-takers and never-takers.
τ =
J∑
j=1
wCOj TE
CO
j (1, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 0, nATj ) +
(
NAT
NCO
) J∑
j=1
wATj PE
AT
j (1, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 0, nATj − 1)
+
(
NNT
NCO
) J∑
j=1
wNTj PE
NT
j (0, n
AT
j + n
CO
j ; 0, n
AT
j )
(5)
Theorem 1 states that under interference, τ is no longer the CACE and hence, the usual
estimator for τ , say the IV estimator in Section 2.4, no longer estimates the CACE. To
understand what τ becomes under interference, consider again the definitions of spillover
and total effects in Section 3.1. Spillover effects fix individuals’ own treatment assignments,
but vary their friends’ treatment assignments. Hence, to observe spillover effects under
noncompliance, individuals must always take the treatment (or control) irrespective of the
intervention assignment; this allows the treatment received to be fixed under all cluster
treatment allocations, zj = 1 and zj = 0. In contrast, total effects vary individuals and their
peers’ treatment assignments. To observe total effects under noncompliance, individuals
must comply with their treatment assignments so that there is variation in their treatment
receipts. Combined together, the effect definitions show that spillover effects PEs are asso-
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ciated with always-takers AT and never-takers NT whereas total effects TEs are associated
with compliers CO in equation (5). Also, since each cluster has a mixture of compliers,
never-takers, and always-takers and spillover effects may not be zero under interference, τ
becomes a combination of effects from the subgroups in equation (5). This intuition also
suggests that, generally speaking, spillover effects among compliers or total effects among
never-takers and always-takers may not be identifiable in CRTs with noncompliance.
We can also express τ in equation (5) in terms of population average effects, similar to
population average effects in Hudgens and Halloran (2008). Let TE
CO
(1; 0) be the population
average total effect among compliers, PE
AT
(1) be the population average spillover effect
among always-takers, and PE
NT
(0) be the population average spillover effect among never-
takers.
TE
CO
(1; 0) =
1
NCO
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
TEji(1, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 0, nATj )I(ji is CO)
PE
AT
(1) =
1
NAT
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
PEji(1, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 0, nATj − 1)I(ji is AT)
PE
NT
(0) =
1
NNT
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
PEji(0, n
AT
j + n
CO
j ; 0, n
AT
j )I(ji is NT)
Then, τ can be written as a linear combination of population average effects, i.e.
τ = TE
CO
(1; 0) +
(
NAT
NCO
)
PE
AT
(1) +
(
NNT
NCO
)
PE
NT
(0) (6)
Next, Corollary 1 states the form of τ under one-sided noncompliance in assumption (A4.1).
Corollary 1. Suppose the assumptions in Theorem 1 hold except we replace (A4) with
(A4.1). Then, nATj = 0 for all j and τ becomes
τ = TE
CO
(1; 0) +
(
NNT
NCO
)
PE
NT
(0) (7)
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We take a moment to relate our results to those in the literature on interference and
noncompliance. First, a key difference between the population effects that make up τ and
those in Hudgens and Halloran (2008) is that Hudgens and Halloran (2008) studied contrasts
between two treatment policies in the population, say treatment policy 1 that assigns 50% of
individuals in a cluster to treatment, and treatment policy 2 that assigns 30% of individuals
in a cluster to treatment, and their population average effects averaged over all individuals
in the study. In our case, because of noncompliance, each cluster may have different number
of people who actually took the treatment. Also, our population average effects TE
CO
(1; 0),
PE
AT
(1), and PE
NT
(0) averaged over subgroups of the population. Our population average
effects become those in Hudgens and Halloran (2008) if everyone in the study is a complier.
Specifically, under this case, the population average effects would become contrasts between
two treatment policies, one where everyone in a cluster is treated and one where everyone
is not treated and τ reduces to the population average total effect of Hudgens and Halloran
(2008). Second, Theorem 1 can be seen as a generalization of the classical identification
results of CACE (Imbens and Angrist 1994; Angrist et al. 1996) that allows for interference.
In particular, without interference, the spillover effects in τ equal zero, the total effect is the
direct effect (Hudgens and Halloran 2008) and τ in Theorem 1 reduces to the CACE.
We briefly discuss the relationship between instrument strength and our identification
result. Broadly speaking, an instrument is strong when there are more compliers than never-
takers or always-takers so that NNT/NCO ≈ 0 and NAT/NCO ≈ 0 and τD is far away from
0. When the instrument is strong, τ in Theorem 1 mainly represents the compliers in the
population, specifically their total effects. However, suppose the instrument is weak; there
are more never-takers or always-takers than compliers so that NNT/NCO or NAT/NCO are
far away from zero. Then, τ may predominantly represent the always-takers or never-takers
in the population and the effects among compliers may make up a small portion of τ .
15
3.3 Unbiased Estimation of Network Effects is Impossible
Previous section showed that the standard IV method failed to identify the causal quantities
discussed in Section 3.1 in CRTs with noncompliance and interference; it identifies mixtures
of effects. Next, we address whether any analysis can be informative about these causal
quantities by showing that there are no unbiased estimators for them.
Formally, consider again the estimands defined in Section 3.1, the total effect among com-
pliers, TE
CO
(1; 0), and the spillover effects among always-takers and never-takers, PE
AT
(1)
and PE
NT
(0), respectively. Unbiased estimators exist for the denominators of these quan-
tities; see Section 4 for details. Hence, to learn more about total and spillover effects from
data, we need to be able to estimate the numerator of these quantities. The numerator of
these quantities are also sums of individual total and spillover effects among their respective
subgroups.
TE
CO
sum(1; 0) =
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
TEji(1, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 0, nATj )I(ji is CO) (8)
PE
AT
sum(1) =
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
PEji(1, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 1, nATj − 1)I(ji is AT) (9)
PE
NT
sum(0) =
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
PEji(0, n
AT
j + n
CO
j ; 0, n
AT
j )I(ji is NT) (10)
Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 show that no unbiased estimators exist for these sums in CRTs
with noncompliance and interference.
Theorem 2. Suppose the assumptions in Theorem 1 hold and consider the numerators
of TE
CO
(1; 0), PE
AT
(1) and PE
NT
(0) in equations (8)-(10). They cannot be unbiasedly
estimated from the observed data Y,D, and Z.
Corollary 2. Suppose the assumptions in Corollary 1 hold. Then TE
CO
sum(1; 0) and PE
NT
sum(0)
are not identified based on the observed quantities Y,D, and Z.
In a nutshell, the key idea behind Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 is based on the result from
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Theorem 1. Theorem 1 states, among other things, that the standard analysis identifies a
mixture of the sums in equations (8)-(10). To unbiasedly estimate each sum individually, we
need a function, say f , where it takes in data, Y,D, and Z, and classifies each individual
as a complier, always-taker, or a never-taker, all from the observed data. Alternatively, we
need an experimental design that doesn’t mix the effects from compliers, always-takers, and
never-takers in each cluster. The technical portion of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 shows that
neither is possible: no such function f exist and CRTs, as an experimental design, generally
produces mixture of effects from different subgroups. As negative results, Theorem 2 and
Corollary 2 highlight that traditional CRTs have fundamental limitations as experimental
designs to elucidate network causal effects under noncompliance and interference.
Finally, while Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 prove that total and spillover effects are gen-
erally impossible to unbiasedly estimate under assumptions (A1)-(A5), they do not rule of
local conditions that allow unbiased estimation. For example, if everyone in the study are
compliers, then we can estimate TE
CO
(1; 0) from data by using the standard IV method
since the terms that are associated with non-compliers and that make up τ in Theorem 1 go
away. Similarly, under one-sided noncompliance, if everyone in the study are never-takers,
then we can estimate PE
NT
(0) by using the standard IV method. These two are specific,
local data generating scenarios that allow identification. In practice, however, such scenarios
are rare.
3.4 Bounds under Non-Negative Treatment Effects
Taken pessimistically, Sections 3.2 and 3.3 showed that learning about network treatment
effects in Section 3.1 is hopeless with CRTs when treatment spillovers and noncompliance are
present and perhaps, investigators who already ran CRTs, like those from the PSDP, should
limit their analysis to ITT effects. This section shows that this pessimism towards ITT
effects is not always warranted and CRTs may still yield useful information about network
treatment effects under the partial identification framework. In particular, in CRTs with
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one-sided noncompliance, if we assume the treatment is not harmful to the individual and
his peers, it is possible to calculate informative bounds on the total effect among compliers
and the spillover effect among never-takers.
Formally, a treatment is not harmful, or has non-negative total and spillover effects, if
the following hold.
(A6) Non-Negative Treatment Effects. For 0 ≤ k0 < k1 ≤ nj − 1, individual i in cluster j
has
TEji(1, k1; 0, k0) ≥ 0, PEji(0, k1; 0, k0) ≥ 0 (11)
We note that assumption (A6) is similar to an assumption by Choi (2017) about treatment
monotonicity. In the PSDP, assumption (A6) is reasonable because it is unlikely that expo-
sure to deworming treatments would increase the presence of infection. Also, in the PDSP,
the study incorporated one-sided noncompliance by design.
Let y = TE
CO
(1; 0) and x = PE
NT
(0). Then, we can write τ as
y = τ − N
NT
NCO
x (12)
Equation (12) suggests that an inverse relationship between the total average effect among
compliers and the spillover average effect among never-takers. Specifically, as the spillover
average effect becomes positive, the total average effect must become negative. Moreover,
by (A6) and one-sided noncompliance, y ≥ 0 and x ≥ 0, which along with equation (12)
gives us bounds on both the total and the spillover effect.
0 ≤ TECO(1; 0) ≤ τ, 0 ≤ PENT(0) ≤ τ N
CO
NNT
(13)
The boundaries of the bounds in equation (13) are achieved when either effect is at the
extreme; TE
CO
(1; 0) = 0 if PE
NT
(0) = τ N
CO
NNT
and PE
NT
(0) = 0 if TE
CO
(1; 0) = τ .
If the outcome is binary, we can impose tighter constraints on both equations (12) and
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(13) as follows.
y = τ − N
NT
NCO
x, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 (14)
and
max
(
0, τ − N
NT
NCO
)
≤ TECO(1; 0) ≤ min(1, τ) (15)
max
(
0,
NCO
NNT
(τ − 1)
)
≤ PENT(0) ≤ min
(
1, τ
NCO
NNT
)
(16)
In equation (16), the bound for the spillover effect PE
NT
(0) becomes tighter as the number
of never-takers increases and exceeds the number of compliers. If, however, the number of
compliers increased and exceeded the number of never-takers, then we have a tighter bound
for the total effect TE
CO
(1; 0). This is in agreement with Theorem 1 where τ is a weighted
mixture of subgroup effects and the weights are proportional to the number of individuals
in each subgroup.
Figure 1 summarizes the characteristics of the bounds in equation (15) by plotting the
range of spillover and total effects as a function of the proportion of compliers and τ . For
example, when τ = 0.75, as the number of compliers increase, the plausible range of the
total effect among compliers decreases. However, as the number of compliers decrease, τ
becomes more representative of the never-takers and hence, we get shorter plausible values
for the spillover effect and longer plausible values for the total effect. Note that the upper
bound on the total effect is 0.75 and it has a non-trivial (i.e. non-zero) lower-bounded if the
compliance rate is high.
When τ = 1.25, the spillover effect among never-takers is always bounded away from
zero; more generally, if τ > 1, the lower bound on the spillover effect is always bounded
away from zero. The upper bound depends on the compliance rate, with higher compliance
resulting in wider bounds on the spillover effect. However, if the compliance rate is very high
and reaches the absolute maximum of τ , we reach a point where there are tight bounds for
both the spillover and the total effect. This is because for a binary Y , τ is bounded above
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Figure 1: A Numerical Example of Bounding Total Effect Among Compliers and Spillover
Effect Among Never-Takers in a One-Sided Noncompliance CRT with Binary Outcomes.
by 1 + NNT/NCO and therefore, high compliance rates coupled with τ > 1 would force the
average effect among never-takers and compliers to be closer to 1, the maximum possible
value.
The numerical example suggests that for CRTs with one-sided noncompliance where
assumption (A6) is plausible, informative analysis is possible for spillover and total treatment
effects. As a general rule of thumb for binary Y , with τ > 1 and a high compliance rate, we
can obtain tight bounds on both the total and spillover effects. If τ > 1 and the compliance
rate is low, then we can obtain tight bounds on the spillover effect, but not the total effect.
If τ < 1 and the compliance rate is high, then we can also obtain tight bounds on the total
effect, but not the spillover effect. If τ < 1 and the compliance rate is low, then we can
obtain tight upper bounds on both the total and spillover effects.
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4 Estimation
We now outline how to estimate the bounds in Section 3.4, specifically τ , NCO and NNT.
Generally, estimation of the three parameters directly follow prior literature on noncompli-
ance and we review one estimation method below.
Formally, to estimate τ , we can use the ratio of the estimated ITT effect with the esti-
mated compliance effect, i.e.
τ̂Y =
1
N
(
J∑
j=1
J
m
Zj
nj∑
i=1
Yji −
J∑
j=1
J
J −m(1− Zj)
nj∑
i=1
Yji
)
τ̂D =
1
N
(
J∑
j=1
J
m
Zj
nj∑
i=1
Dji −
J∑
j=1
J
J −m(1− Zj)
nj∑
i=1
Dji
)
τ̂ =
τ̂Y
τ̂D
Kang and Keele (2018) prove that this version of the ratio estimator τˆ is superior in term of
bias compared to other IV methods for CRTs; see Kang and Keele (2018) for details as well
as a derivation of the estimator’s distributional properties. To estimate the subgroup sizes,
NCO and NNT, we use the following estimators
N̂CO =
J∑
j=1
J
m
Zj
nj∑
i=1
Dji −
J∑
j=1
J
J −m(1− Zj)
nj∑
i=1
Dji, N̂
NT =
J∑
j=1
J
m
Zj
nj∑
i=1
(1−Dji)
Under assumptions (A1), these estimators are unbiased for NCO and NNT.
Let LCOTE = max
(
0, τ − NNT
NCO
)
, UCOTE = min(1, τ), L
NT
PE = max
(
0, N
CO
NNT
(τ − 1)
)
, and
UNTPE = min
(
1, τ N
CO
NNT
)
be the lower and upper bounds of the total and spillover effects in
equations (15) and (16). Let L̂COTE = max
(
0, τ̂ − N̂NT
N̂CO
)
, ÛCOTE = min(1, τ̂), L̂
NT
PE = max
(
0, N̂
CO
N̂NT
(τ̂ − 1)
)
,
and ÛNTPE = min
(
1, τ̂ N̂
CO
N̂NT
)
be the plug-in estimates for these bounds. The following theorem
shows that these plug-in estimators are consistent estimators under the asymptotic regime
where the cluster size remains fixed while the number of clusters go to infinity.
Theorem 3. Suppose assumptions (A1)-(A4.1) and (A5)-(A6) hold. Let NCO/N = pCO
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and NNT/N = pNT be the population proportion of complier and never-takers. Consider the
asymptotic regime where the number of clusters go to infinity while the cluster size remains
bounded, i.e. J, J −m→∞ where (i) m/J → p ∈ (0, 1), (ii) nj ≤ B for some constant B,
(iii) pCO ∈ (0, 1), pNT ∈ (0, 1), τD, and τY are fixed for every J . Then,
|L̂COTE − LCOTE | → 0, |ÛCOTE − UCOTE | → 0, |L̂NTPE − LNTPE | → 0, |ÛNTPE − UNTPE | → 0
in probability.
Conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3 are standard asymptotic regimes for CRTs where
the number of clusters go to infinity while the cluster size remains fixed; Kang and Keele
(2018) shows that in the opposite asymptotic regime where the number of clusters remain
fixed, but the cluster size goes to infinity, typical CRT estimators exhibit poor properties.
Condition (iii) follows Chapter 4.4 of Lehmann (2004) where in finite sample settings, the
asymptotic embedding sequence has the same mean for every N ; this type of asymptotics
has been used in noncompliance settings (Baiocchi et al. 2010). Condition (iii) is technical in
that it allows us to approximate the behavior of the estimators in a mathematically tractable
fashion. Theorem 3 can be extended to handle non-binary outcomes outlined in equation
(13) under appropriate growth conditions on the outcome. We will use Theorem 3 as a basis
for constructing bounds in our empirical example in Section 5.
While Theorem 3 provides a consistent estimator for the bounds, it does not characterize
uncertainty. As is typical, our bounds are partially based on minimum (min) and maximum
(max) operators, and the sample estimates of bounds based on these operators will tend
to be narrower than the true bounds (Manski and Pepper 2009, 2000). In addition, the
presence of min or max operators makes it difficult to derive a closed form expression for the
asymptotic distribution of bounds, and bootstrap techniques are generally invalid as well
(Hirano and Porter 2012; Andrews and Guggenberger 2009; Andrews 2000; Romano and
Shaikh 2008; Romano 1989; Romano and Shaikh 2010). See Tamer (2010) for an overview.
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One solution is to assume an infinite population model with independent and identically
distributed observables. Under an IID infinite population model, Cheng and Small (2006)
used the percentile bootstrap method of Horowitz and Manski (2000) to construct confidence
intervals for bounds based on IV. However, in our application, the assumption of an infinite
population model is unrealistic given the clustered treatment assignment mechanism and the
small number of clusters.
In response to these issues, we use Chernozhukov et al. (2013) which developed methods
for bias-corrected estimators and confidence intervals for intersection bounds under more
general sampling mechanisms. The Chernozhukov-Lee-Rosen (CLR) approach uses precision-
corrected estimates of the terms in the bounding functions before applying the min and max
operators. The CLR approach to estimation is half-median unbiased. This implies that the
upper bound estimator exceeds the true value of the upper bound with probability at least
one half asymptotically; with the same being true of the lower bound estimator. The CLR
approach does depend on the estimators of the bounding functions being consistent and
asymptotically normally distributed. As we showed above, our derived bounding functions
are consistent and asymptotically normal. In Section 5, we apply the CLR approach to
estimate the bounds and confidence intervals.
5 The Effect of Deworming in the Presence of Non-
compliance and Spillovers
The initial analysis of the PSDP intervention focused on estimating ITT effects, specifically
the direct effect of the deworming intervention and the treatment spillover effects (Miguel
and Kremer 2004); the original analysis did not include any analyses that focused on treat-
ment effects. Nevertheless, the original data included detailed measures of whether students
complied with cluster-level treatment assignment. In our analysis, we use an updated version
of the data that corrected a series of data errors in the original data (Aiken et al. 2015; Hicks
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et al. 2015). In our analysis, we focus on the primary outcome from the original study, which
was a binary indicator for the presence of a helminth infection.
First, we carry out the standard IV analysis, which is what an investigator may naively try
with CRT data with noncompliance, falsely assuming that effects from treatment spillovers
are mitigated due to clustered treatment assignment. Using the method in Kang and Keele
(2018) to estimate τ , our estimate of τ is −.41 with a 95% confidence interval of −.29 and
−.53. While τ is easily estimable using existing IV methods, the presence of spillovers no
longer allows us to interpret this quantity as the complier average causal effect; τ is no longer
the effect for compliers alone, but also includes never-takers. Instead, we focus on estimating
the bounds for both the total effect among compliers, TE
CO
(1; 0), and the spillover effect
among never-takers, PE
NT
(0)
As a reminder, in the PSDP study, compliance was one-sided and the primary outcome
was binary. Therefore, we can plug in estimates of N̂NT, N̂CO, and τˆ into equation (13) to
estimate the bounds. In the PDSP intervention, the instrument is fairly strong: average
student compliance in schools assigned to treatment was 82%. As such, the number of
compliers is high relative to the number of never-takers, which indicates we should be able
to obtain relatively informative bounds on TE
CO
(1; 0), but not on PE
NT
(0; 0). The estimated
half-median unbiased bounds on TE
CO
(1; 0) are -0.198 and -0.414 and the CLR bias-corrected
95% confidence intervals for the bounds are -0.062 and -0.542. Thus among compliers, we
can be 95% confident that the reduction in infections was as small as 6% or as high as 54%.
Next, we calculated the bound for PE
NT
(0; 0). The estimated bounds are 0 and 1. This is
not surprising given the paucity of never-takers relative to compliers in the data.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied CRTs with both noncompliance and treatment spillovers. In many
public health interventions, subjects may refuse treatments but are partially exposed when
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other subjects take the treatment. In the PSDP, some students did not take the medications
that comprised the treatment. However, infection levels may be lower for these unexposed
students as peers who took the treatment lowered their likelihood of environmental exposure
to helminths.
We showed that causal estimands of interest cannot be estimated under the standard
assumptions used under both noncompliance and interference. The standard IV analysis
leads to identifying mixture of causal effects instead of the usual complier average causal
effect. We extended the result to show that unbiased estimation of key components of the
causal estimands in Section 3.1 is impossible. Finally, we showed that investigators must
rely on partial identification methods to place bounds on these quantities. While partial
identification results often produce wide bounds that are uninformative, we showed that in
the PSDP data, the bounds are informative even once sampling uncertainty is accounted for.
The bounds depend strongly on the ratio of compliers to noncompliers. As such if the
total effect among compliers is of primary interest, investigators can sharpen the bounds by
designing interventions that maximize compliance with assigned treatment status. In fact,
full compliance with assigned treatment status is the most direct way to eliminate the lack
of point identification. However, if the effect among never-takers is of greater interest, the
design of the intervention could focus less on encouraging compliance. In general, increasing
compliance may be easier than reducing compliance, which implies that it may be difficult
to sharpen the bound for the spillover effect among never-takers.
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7 Proofs of Key Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Under network exclusion restriction and stratified interference, let Y
(dji,[k])
ji
denote any potential outcome where individual i has compliance value dji and k of his/her
peers have dji′ = 1, i
′ 6= i.
We start by decomposing the term Y
(1,D
(1)
ji ,D
(1)
j−i)
ji − Y
(0,D
(0)
ji ,D
(0)
j−i)
ji in τY , i.e. the numerator
of τ . Under network exclusion restriction, we have
Y
(1,D
(1)
ji ,D
(1)
j−i)
ji − Y
(0,D
(0)
ji ,D
(0)
j−i)
ji (17)
=Y
(D
(1)
ji ,D
(1)
j−i)
ji − Y
(D
(0)
ji ,D
(0)
j−i)
sji (18)
=
(
D
(1)
ji Y
(1,D
(1)
j−i)
ji + (1−D(1)ji )Y
(0,D
(1)
j−i)
ji
)
−
(
D
(0)
ji Y
(1,D
(0)
j−i)
ji + (1−D(0)ji )Y
(0,D
(0)
j−i)
ji
)
(19)
Under stratified interference, we can decompose the term Y
(dj ,D
(1)
j−i)
ji above into
Y
(dji,D
(zj)
j−i )
ji =
nj−1∑
k=0
Y
(dji,[k])
ji I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(zj)
ji
)
Then, the term Y
(1,D
(1)
ji ,D
(1)
j−i)
ji − Y
(0,D
(0)
ji ,D
(0)
j−i)
ji simplifies to
nj−1∑
k=0
Y
(1,[k])
ji
[
D
(1)
ji I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(1)
ji
)
−D(0)ji I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(0)
ji
)]
+
nj−1∑
k=0
Y
(0,[k])
ji
[
I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(1)
ji
)
− I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(0)
ji
)]
−
nj−1∑
k=0
Y
(0,[k])
ji
[
D
(1)
ji I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(1)
ji
)
−D(0)ji I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(0)
ji
)]
=
nj−1∑
k=0
(Y
(1,[k])
ji − Y (0,[k])ji )
[
D
(1)
ji I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(1)
ji
)
−D(0)ji I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(0)
ji
)]
+
nj−1∑
k=0
Y
(0,[k])
ji [I(ji is CO) + I(ji is AT) + I(ji is NT)]
[
I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(1)
ji
)
− I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(0)
ji
)]
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The expression
[
D
(1)
ji I
(
k =
∑
−iD
(1)
ji
)
−D(0)ji I
(
k =
∑
−iD
(0)
ji
)]
can only take on values
−1, 0, and 1. Additionally, under fixed F , the quantities ∑−iD(1)ji and ∑−iD(0)ji are pre-
determined; thus, there will only be one value of k for which I
(
k =
∑
−iD
(1)
ji
)
= 1 and
I
(
k =
∑
−iD
(0)
ji
)
= 1. Also,
∑
−iD
(1)
ji is the number of ATs and COs that ji has and∑
−iD
(0)
ji is the number of ATs that ji has. If ji is an AT, then
∑
−iD
(1)
ji = n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1
and
∑
−iD
(0)
ji = n
AT
j − 1. If ji is a CO, then
∑
−iD
(1)
ji = n
AT
j +n
CO
j − 1 and
∑
−iD
(0)
ji = n
AT
j .
If ji is an NT, then
∑
−iD
(1)
ji = n
AT
j + n
CO
j and
∑
−iD
(0)
ji = n
AT
j . Thus, the algebraic
expression above simplifies to
nj−1∑
k=0
(Y
(1,[k])
ji − Y (0,[k])ji )
[
D
(1)
ji I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(1)
ji
)
−D(0)ji I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(0)
ji
)]
+
nj−1∑
k=0
Y
(0,[k])
ji [I(ji is CO) + I(ji is AT) + I(ji is NT)]
[
I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(1)
ji
)
− I
(
k =
∑
−i
D
(0)
ji
)]
=(Y
(1,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji − Y
(0,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji )I(ji is CO)
+(Y
(1,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji − Y
(0,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji )I(ji is AT)
−(Y (1,[n
AT
j −1])
ji − Y
(0,[nATj −1])
ji )I(ji is AT)
+Y
(0,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji I(ji is CO)− Y
(0,[nATj ])
ji I(sji is CO)
+Y
(0,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji I(ji is AT)− Y
(0,[nATj −1])
ji I(ji is AT)
+Y
(0,[nATj +n
CO
j ])
ji I(ji is NT)− Y
(0,[nATj ])
ji I(ji is NT)
=DEji(1, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 0, nATj + nCOj − 1)I(ji is CO)
+PEji(0, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 0, nATj )I(ji is CO)
+PEji(1, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 1, nATj − 1)I(ji is AT)
+PEji(0, n
AT
j + n
CO
j ; 0, n
AT
j )I(ji is NT)
=TEji(1, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 0, nATj )I(ji is CO)
+PEji(1, n
AT
j + n
CO
j − 1; 1, nATj − 1)I(ji is AT)
+PEji(0, n
AT
j + n
CO
j ; 0, n
AT
j )I(ji is NT)
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Then, summing these quantities over all clusters give you the sum of total effects and spillover
effects for different subgroups CO, AT, and NT. Dividing this quantity τD, which constitutes
the total number of compliers in the population, and appropriate scaling factor gives the
desired result.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we work with TE
CO
sum(1; 0), which simplifies to
TE
CO
sum(1; 0) =
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
(Y
(1,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji − Y
(0,[nATj ])
ji )(D
(1)
ji −D(0)ji )
=
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
Y
(1,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji (D
(1)
ji −D(0)ji ) + Y
(0,[nATj ])
ji D
(0)
ji −
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
Y
(0,[nATj ])
ji D
(1)
ji
Suppose there exists an unbiased estimator T (Y,D,Z) for TE
CO
sum(1; 0),
E[T (Y,D,Z) | F ,Z] =
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
Y
(1,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji (D
(1)
ji −D(0)ji )+Y
(0,[nATj ])
ji D
(0)
ji −
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
Y
(0,[nATj ])
ji D
(1)
ji
By the definition of expectations and assumption (A1), we have
E[T (Y,D,Z) | F ,Z] (20)
=
1(
J
m
)∑
z∈Z
T (Y,D, z) (21)
=
1(
J
m
)
 ∑
z∈Z;zj=1
T (Y,D, 1, z−1) +
∑
z∈Z;zj=0
T (Y,D, 0, z−1)
 (22)
=
1(
J
m
)
 ∑
z∈Z;zj=1
T (Y
(D
(1)
11 ,D
(1)
1−1)
11 , . . . , Y
(D
(1)
1n1
,D
(1)
1−n1 )
1n1
, . . . , Y
(D
(zJ )
JnJ
,D
(1)
J−nJ )
JnJ
, D
(1)
11 , . . . , D
(1)
1n1
, . . . , D
(zJ )
JnJ
, 1, z−1)
(23)
+
∑
z∈Z;zj=0
T (Y
(D
(0)
11 ,D
(0)
1−1)
11 , . . . , Y
(D
(0)
1n1
,D
(0)
1−n1 )
1n1
, . . . , Y
(D
(zJ )
JnJ
,D
(zJ )
J−nJ )
JnJ
, D
(0)
11 , . . . , D
(0)
1n1
, . . . , D
(zJ )
JnJ
, 0, z−1)

(24)
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None of the terms in the summand above can produce the terms Y
(0,[nAT1 ])
1i D
(1)
1i for cluster
j = 1. For example, if D
(1)
1i is an input, then its corresponding Y1i input is always Y
(D
(1)
1i ,D
(1)
1−i)
1i ,
which cannot equal Y
(0,[nAT1 ])
1i ; D
(1)
1i = 0 implies that individual i is a never-taker and hence,∑
−iD
(1)
1i = n
CO
1 + n
AT
1 and we would only observe Y
(0,[nCO1 +n
AT
1 ])
1i . Hence, the expectation
expression cannot produce the term in TE
CO
sum(1; 0) that involves the product Y
(0,[nATj ])
1i D
(1)
1i ,
a contradiction. Thus, the unbiased estimator T (·) cannot exist.
Second, we simplify PE
AT
sum(1)
PE
AT
sum(1) =
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
(Y
(1,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji − Y
(1,[nATj −1])
ji )D
(0)
ji
=
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
Y
(1,[nATj +n
CO
j −1])
ji D
(0)
ji −
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
Y
(1,[nATj −1])
ji D
(0)
ji
Again, consider an unbiased estimator T (Y,D,Z) for PE
AT
sum(1). Based on our previous
analysis of the expectation of the unbiased estimator, we see that none of the terms in equa-
tion (24) can produce the term Y
(1,[nAT1 +n
CO
j −1])
1i D
(0)
1i . If D
(0)
1i is an input, its corresponding
Y1i input is always Y
(D
(0)
1i ,D
(0)
1−i)
1i , which cannot equal Y
(1,[nAT1 +n
CO
j −1])
1i ; D
(0)
1i = 1 implies that
individual i is an always-taker,
∑
−iD
(0)
1i = n
AT
1 − 1, and we only observe Y (1,[n
AT
1 −1])
1i . Thus,
the unbiased estimator T (·) cannot exist.
Third, we simplify PE
NT
sum(0)
PE
NT
sum(0) =
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
(Y
(0,[nATj +n
CO
j ])
ji − Y
(0,[nATj ])
ji )(1−D(1)ji )
=
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
Y
(0,[nATj +n
CO
j ])
ji (1−D(1)ji )−
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
Y
(0,[nATj ])
ji +
J∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
Y
(0,[nATj ])
ji D
(1)
ji
Again, consider an unbiased estimator T (Y,D,Z) for PE
AT
sum(1). Based on our previous
analysis of the expectation of the unbiased estimator, we see that none of the terms in
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equation (24) can produce the term Y
(0,[nAT1 ])
1i D
(1)
1i using the same reasoning as TE
CO
sum(1; 0).
Thus, the unbiased estimator T (·) cannot exist.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof proceeds in two steps. We first show that the estimators τ̂
and N
CO
NNT
are consistent Second, we utilize the continuous mapping theorem to show that the
estimators for the bounds are consistent.
First, under (A1), the numerators and denominators that make up τ̂ , τ̂Y and τ̂D are unbi-
ased for τY and τD, respectively. Let Y˜
(1)
j. =
∑nj
i=1 Y
(1,D
(1)
ji ,D
(1)
j−i)
ji and Y˜
(0)
j. =
∑nj
i=1 Y
(0,D
(0)
ji ,D
(0)
j−i)
ji .
Then, the variances of τ̂Y and τ̂D are
V ar [τ̂Y | F ,Z] = V ar
[
J
N
J∑
j=1
Zj
(
Y˜
(1)
j.
m
+
Y˜
(0)
j.
J −m
)
| F ,Z
]
=
J2
N2
· m(J −m)
J(J − 1)
J∑
j=1
[(
Y˜
(1)
j.
m
+
Y˜
(0)
j.
J −m
)
− 1
J
J∑
j=1
(
Y˜
(1)
j.
m
+
Y˜
(0)
j.
J −m
)]2
≤ J
2
N2
· m(J −m)
J(J − 1)
J∑
j=1
(
Y˜
(1)
j.
m
+
Y˜
(0)
j.
J −m
)2
≤ J2 · m(J −m)
J(J − 1) ·
J2
m2(J −m)2 ·
∑J
j=1 n
2
j(∑J
j=1 nj
)2
≤ J
3
(J − 1)(m)(J −m) ·
JB2
J2
As J, J −m→∞, the upper bound on the variance goes to zero and we have consistency of
τ̂Y . A similar argument can be used to also prove that V ar [τ̂D | F ,Z]→ 0. Combining the
two consistent estimators via Slutsky’s theorem yields τ̂ = τ̂Y /τ̂D → τY /τD = τ .
Next, we show that the ratio N̂
CO
N̂NT
is consistent for the ratio p
CO
pNT
. We see that
N̂CO
N̂NT
=
1
N
∑J
j=1
J
m
Zj
∑nj
i=1Dji −
∑J
j=1
J
J−m(1− Zj)
∑nj
i=1Dji
1
N
∑J
j=1
J
m
Zj
∑nj
i=1(1−Dji)
=
1
N
∑J
j=1
J
m
Zjn
CO
j
1
N
∑J
j=1
J
m
ZjnNTj
Notice that the expectation for the numerator and the denominators are unbiased estimators
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of the proportions pCO and pNT.
E
[
1
N
J∑
j=1
J
m
Zjn
CO
j | F ,Z
]
=
NCO
N
= pCO
E
[
1
N
J∑
j=1
J
m
Zjn
NT
j | F ,Z
]
=
NNT
N
= pNT
Also, the variance of the unbiased estimator of pCO is
V ar
[
1
N
J∑
j=1
J
m
Zjn
CO
j | F ,Z
]
=
J2
N2
· J −m
Jm(J − 1) ·
J∑
j=1
(
nCOj −
1
J
J∑
j=1
nCOj
)2
≤ J(J −m)
m(J − 1) ·
∑J
j=1
(
nCOj
)2(∑J
j=1 nj
)2
≤ J(J −m)
m(J − 1) ·
JB2
J2
→ 0
A similar argument can also show that the variance for the unbiased estimator of pNT goes
to zero. Consequently, we have
N̂CO
N̂NT
→ p
CO
pNT
Finally, since the maximum and minimums with fixed numerical values are continuous func-
tions, we can use the continuous mapping theorem to arrive at the desired consistency for
the bound estimators.
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